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Abstract 
We estimated the impact of the performance of corporate governance on economic growth in a cross-country 
framework in two specifications. For analysis we have employed log liner model. We found that performance of 
corporate governance is significantly negatively related to the economic growth in both specification and in all models 
and hence it matters not only for the current year but it continues to persistent in future also. Addition to it, we found 
that role played by human capital is insignificant but physical capital and government final consumption expenditure 
plays significantly positive role in the economic growth of cross-section of countries. We also find that impact of life 
expectancy and fertility rate is negative and positive on economic growth respectively. We found that trade does not 
has significant impact on the economic growth in cross-section of countries.
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1.  Introduction  
Corporate governance is more encompassing than legal infrastructure per se. Weimer and Pape 
(1999) defines corporate governance as a ‘country specific framework of legal, institutional and 
cultural factors, shaping the patterns of influence that stakeholders exert on managerial decision-
making’.  Charreaux  (1997)  defines  corporate  governance  as  “…all  the  organisational 
mechanisms which have the effect of bounding the powers and of influencing the decisions of 
the managers, in other words, the mechanisms which ‘govern’ their behaviour and define their 
discretionary space”. Pass (2004) argues that corporate governance deals with the ‘duties and 
responsibilities  of  a  company’s  board  of  directors  in  managing  the  company  and  their 
relationships with the shareholders of the company and the stakeholder groups’.  
With  the  integration  of  the  world  economy  economic  forces/factors  compels  each  other  to 
functionally  harmonize  the  activities  of  legal  amalgamation,  liquidation  and  other  corporate 
governance  systems.  For  well  functioning  of  the  business  operations  (like  corporations, 
partnership,  joint  ventures  etc.)  and/or  activities  (like  contracting  and  in  the  case  of  default 
remedy of default) the necessary infrastructure is provided by the law. And a system which does 
not have a law which talks about the rights of investors, motivation among the investor either 
domestic or foreign will be almost negligible and once national laws are harmonized growth and 
development  of  the  business  activities  will  prosper  and  thereby  economic  growth  and 
development  of  the  nation  in  question.  Corporate  governance  systems  play  a  central role  in 
economic performance because they provide mechanisms affecting the returns on investment by 
suppliers of external finance to firms. They should also provide a set of institutional and market 
mechanisms that allow managers and board members to maximize the value of the residual cash 
flows of the organization to the shareholders or members. It is well established fact that if all 
domestic markets (like labour, goods, money and capital markets) of the economy are working 
efficiently, maximum possible growth rate can be achieved as efficient functioning also implies 
efficient utilization of resources. Addition to that achieving of the maximum possible growth is 
not the ultimate goal the important thing is to maintain that growth over a period of time in other 
words  target  is  sustainable  growth  which  can  be  accomplished  through  sound  legal  system, 
effective regulations and last but not least transparent legal system and these factors emphasize 
on effective disclosure that is elementary to well-functioning markets. Further, there are some 
other  variable  which  are  also  important  in  sustainable  development  like  sound  social 
frameworks; attention to the long-term impacts of investment decisions and business processes 
on the economic growth, society and last but not least the environment;  timely and accurate 
information which assists shareholders in exercising control and investors in allocating funds to 
their  most  productive  uses;  role  of  governmental  authorities  in  monitoring  markets  and  in 
identifying vulnerabilities and efforts in trying to solve those vulnerabilities; and last but not 
least  trust  and  confidence  of  the  domestic  as  well  as  foreign  investors-  that  is  also  a  key 
ingredients of a well-functioning market economy. Therefore, in nut shell we can say that for 
sustainable  and  sound  economic  growth  increased  integrity,  transparency,  discloser,  market 
discipline, effective rule of laws, and corporate social responsibility of the corporate sector are 
the major factors which should be encouraged.   
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Trust  and  confidence  are  key  ingredients  of  a  well-functioning  market  economy.  Restoring 
investor confidence through sound corporate governance, as well as corporate structures and 
market intermediaries that are more accountable, is indispensable to promoting development in 
economies. Corporate integrity, strengthened market discipline, increased transparency through 
improved  disclosure;  effective  regulation  and  corporate  social  responsibility  are  common 
principles that are the foundations for sound macro-economic growth. Andrade and Rossetti 
(2004) have identified three factors that are important for the leverage of the growth of the 
economies.  These  factors  are  trustworthy  and  stimulant  institutions,  good  macroeconomic 
fundamentals and availability of competitive resources. Further, Andrade and Rossetti, (2004) 
argues  that  “one of  the  most  important  complements  of  this  economic  trilogy  is  a  healthful 
business climate, generated by good practices of corporate governance”. Babic (2003) adds that 
the  significance  of  the  corporate  governance  in  emerging countries  can be  explained  by the 
following influence. The first one is the creation of key institutions that direct the success of the 
economy transformation based on the market, second is the efficient allocation of the capital and 
the development of the financial market, third is the attraction of foreign investments and fourth 
is the contribution for the process of national development. De Paula (2003) has identified two 
main mechanisms by which the corporate governance can enhance the growth and development 
of a country. First, corporate governance is directly associated with financing and investment 
(through the capacity of attraction of new shareholders and financial leverage which is closely 
associated with the structure and the practices of corporate governance). Second, through the 
impacts of the corporate governance on the efficiency of the economic system (for example, 
when pressuring the managers to be more disciplined, the corporate governance mechanisms 
encourage to a more efficient allocation of resources). Monforte (2004) accentuate that a good 
governance system helps to strengthen the companies, reinforces competences to face new levels 
of complexity, extends the strategical bases of value creation, is a factor of harmonization of 
interests  and,  contribute  less  volatile  corporate  outcome,  it  increases  the  confidence  of  the 
investors, strengthens the stock market and is a supporting factor of the economic growth. 
 
Further, as an enterprise of any country plays a fundamental role in determining the sources of 
income,  employment  etc.  and  thereby  growth  of  a  country  in  question  therefore,  this  study 
attempts to measure the impact of corporate governance on economic growth of the country. 
Interestingly, we find that corporate governance affects positively the economic growth of the 
countries not only the instant year but its significantly positive impact continues to prevail for 
next four years also.    
Rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2
nd presents review of literature followed by 
discussion on data source, variables definition and methodology adopted for empirical analysis 
in section 3
rd. In section 4
th results of data analysis have been presented followed by conclusions 
drawn from the empirical analysis in section 5
th.   
2.  Literature review  
Since the seminal work of Jensen and Meckling (1976), who applied ‘agency’ theory to the 
modern corporation in the theory of the firm, research on corporate governance took its cue. 
Agency  theory,  which  was  developed  by  Harris  and  Raviv  (1978),  Holmstrom  (1979)  and 
Shavell (1979), is based on the basic presupposition of the maximisation of utility by the agents 
and  principals/shareholders.  An  agent  is  one  who  executes  duties  and  responsibilities  in  the 3 
 
company on behalf of the principal/shareholders. The agent tries to maximize his utility under 
the given conditions of the agreement with the principal. The principals, who hold claims over 
the net income of the company’s business (whether it is positive or negative) tries to maximise 
his  utility  by  manipulating  the  contractual  provisions.  This  is  done  under  the  restriction  of 
guaranteeing to the agent his/her ‘reservation utility’, i.e., the utility the agent can achieve if 
he/she does not enter into the contract (Otsuka and Hayami 1988). In this type of principal-agent 
relationship,  there  is  always  the  ‘inherent  potential  for  conflicts  within  a  firm  because  the 
economic incentives faced by the agents are often unlike from those faced by the principals’ 
(ISDA 2002). Jensen and Meckling (1976) have outlined three potential sources of conflict that 
lead to agency problem are (a) managers’ and boards’ desire to remain in power (b) managerial 
risk aversion and (c) free cash flow. 
There are few studies which have investigated the relationship between corporate governance 
and financial success of the enterprises. For example, Gompers et al. (2003) find that firms with 
strong shareholder rights have superior valuation, better profits, and better sales growth. Brown 
and  Caylor  (2004)  have  recognized  a  relationship  between  size  and  corporate  governance. 
Claessens  (2003)  demonstrates  a  relationship  between  corporate  governance  and  improved 
performance  of  enterprise.  Claessens  (2003)  found  that  the  relationship  between  corporate 
governance to improved performance of the enterprises is not from better corporate governance 
to improved performance; rather it is either the other way around or due to some other factors 
that drives both better corporate governance and better financial performance.  
3.  Objectives, Data source, Methodology and variables description  
This study attempts to estimate the impact of corporate governance and its various ingredients on 
the economic growth in a cross-country framework. To the best of our knowledge there is no 
such study which has made an attempt in this direction. Therefore, objective of the study is 
justified. Further, motivation behind this objective is the important role played by the corporate 
sector in the economic performance of different countries and recent subprime crises is best 
example of it.    
In the study, data has been obtained from the official website of World Bank and was assessed 
on  May  20,  2010  and  October  14,  2010.  We  employ  the  cross-country  analysis  due  to 
unavailability of the data over a period of time. For the analysis we have used Ordinary Least 
Square  (OLS)  method  of  estimation  in  a  log  linear  transform  of  the  model.  Further,  in  the 
analysis  we  have  used  one  variable  which  measures  corporate  governance  and  four  its 
constituents has also been used to go in the deep analysis of it. Additionally, we have used seven 
control  variables  by  following  Barrow  (1991)  namely  total  trade  (as  percentage  of  Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP)), labour force with primary education as percentage of total, labour 
force with secondary education as percentage of total, Gross Fixed Capital Formation (GFCF) (at 
constant prices of 2000 US$), Fertility Rate (FR) (births per woman), General Government Final 
Consumption Expenditure (GGFCE) (at constant prices of 2000 US$) and Life Expectancy (LF) 
at birth (years). Total trade has been measured by merchandise trade as a percentage of gross 
domestic products. As for as expected sign is concerned we anticipate that corporate governance 
and its constituents have positive impact (and therefore, positive sign for corporate governance 
and of all variants of it) on the economic growth since high score implies higher ethical standards 4 
 
achieved  by  enterprise  sector.  Labour  force  with  primary  and  secondary  education,  GFCF, 
GGFCE, LF and FR is expected to have positive impact on economic growth. Trade is expected 
to have positive/negative impact on the economic growth (and therefore, positive or negative 
sign), since if proportion of exports is high in overall trade it will not only bring income but also 
create employment opportunities and vice-versa. Further, for the analysis we have adopted two 
approaches.  In  first  case,  we  have  done  analysis  for  the  year  2004  as  data  on  corporate 
governance  is  available  only  for  the  year  2004  of  all  countries.  In  the  next  case  we  have 
estimated the impact of corporate governance on the economic growth of the year 2008 in order 
to  see  how  much  the  impact  corporate  governance  prevails  after  four  years.  This  has  more 
advantage  to  the  policy  makers  as  it  gives  the  evidence  of  the  dynamic  role  played  by 
performance of corporate governance on the economic performance of countries of the world. 
So, our model to be estimated in first case is  
Yit= α+βXit+λ’Zit+εit-------(1) 
where i represents country, t represents time (in this case t = 2004), Yit is measure of economic 
growth  rate  (measured  by  log  of  the PPP-adjusted  real  GDP  (at  constant  2005  international 
dollar) Xit measures the performance of countries on corporate  governance,  Zit is vector of 
control  variables  (all  variables  are  measured  in  million),  a0  is  an  overall  constant,  and  eit 
represents the net effect of omitted variables which may affect the economic performance of 
countries and assumed to be white noise.  
However,  in  the  second  case,  ceteris  paribus,  t=2008  for  all  variables  except  for  variables 
measuring  corporate  governance  and  labour  force  with  primary  and  secondary  education. 
Further, while carrying out the analysis problem of severe multicollinearity was found therefore, 
all control variables have not been incorporated simultaneously but in different specifications 
and different variants of corporate governance has been incorporated separately in the analysis. 
Finally, Breusch-Pagan test was performed to test for heteroskedasticity and Ramsey RESET test 
has been performed in all models of both cases in order to check for linearity assumption and 
also to test weather our model suffers from omitted variables problems or not.  
4.  Data analysis and results interpretation  
In the first case we have presented the results obtained from the analysis of first specification. 
Results are presented in table 1.  








statistics   
Breusch-Pagan   Ramsey 
RESET test 
Model1 
Constant   8.492866 **    2.39    0.9693 
(0.28698) 




chi2(1)            =     
3.36 
Prob > chi2  =   
0.0667 
F(3,  25)  =      
0.48 
Prob > F =      
0.6998 
Trade   -.0082974  -0.07     1.69 
CICIC  -.5350491***  -4.49  1.63 
LFPE  -.0422262  -0.69  1.25 
GFCF  .9906077***  26.58  1.80 5 
 
FR  .1464314  0.85  2.19 
LE  -.9015085  -1.04  2.35 
Model 2 
Constant   10.93733**  2.29    0.9446 
(0.3856) 
F(6,   
28)  =   
97.60**
* 
chi2(1)            =     
0.70 
Prob > chi2  =   
0.4025 
F(3,  25)  =      
0.45 
Prob > F =      
0.7218 
 
Trade   -.0123162  -0.07  1.70 
CICIC  -.8707591***  -5.30  1.73 
LFPE  0213486  0.26  1.24 
GGFCE  .9112351***  19.46  1.97 
FR  .052408  0.23  2.17 
LE  -.6659923  -0.57  2.34 
Model 3 
Constant   9.921316  2.57    0.9698 
(0.28489) 
F(6,   
28)  =  
182.69*
** 
chi2(1)            =     
1.81 
Prob > chi2  =   
0.1790 
F(3, 25) =      
1.49 
Prob > F =      
0.2422 
Trade   -.0450046  -0.37  1.58 
CICIC  -.5159927***  -4.37  1.63 
LFSE  -.1153679  -0.95  2.16 
GFCF  .9802383***  26.41  1.82 
FR  -.038191  -0.17  3.61 
LE  -1.062587  -1.20  2.47 
Model 4 
Constant   10.62318  2.03    0.9445 
(0.38588) 
F(6,   
28)  =   
97.45**
* 
chi2(1)            =     
0.49 
Prob > chi2  =   
0.4832 
F(3,  25)  =      
0.41 
Prob > F =      
0.7473 
Trade   .0029968  0.02  1.61 
CICIC  -.8788488***  -5.33  1.73 
LFSE  .027378  0.16  2.20 
GGFCE  .9145002***  19.17  2.04 
FR  .1073009  0.36  3.68 
LE  -.6346364  -0.53  2.45 
Model 5 
Constant   12.56899**  3.33    0.9671 
(0.32729) 




chi2(1)            =     
0.90 
Prob > chi2  =   
0.3419 
F(3,  25)  =      
1.77 
Prob > F =      
0.1779 
Trade   -.0695984  -0.49  1.65 
CLCIC  -.3390596***  -3.01  1.37 
LFPE  -.0382353  -0.55  1.25 
GFCF  0.9844173***  23.09  1.81 
FR  .021592  0.11  2.10 
LE  -1.956082**  -2.14  1.98 
Model 6 
Constant   17.14066***  3.31    0.9250 
(.44848) 
F(6,  28) 
=   
70.94**
* 
chi2(1)            =     
1.48 
Prob > chi2  =   
0.2234 
F(3,  25)  =  
0.08 
Prob > F =      
0.9686 
Trade   -.1207205  -0.62  1.65 
CLCIC  -.5804158***  -3.66  1.45 
LFPE  .0263188  0.28  1.24 
GGFCE  .897123***  16.46  1.97 
FR  -.1541965  -0.59  2.07 
LE  -2.22936  -1.77  2.01 
Model 7 
Constant   14.5585  3.66    0.9621  F(6,    chi2(1)          =      F(3,  25)  =      6 
 









Prob > F =      
0.0258 
CLCIC  -.3381245***  -3.10  1.36 
LFSE  -.183363  -1.35  2.15 
GFCF  .9720902***  23.45  1.81 
FR  -.2373  -0.98  3.48 
LE  -2.147797**  -2.38  2.01 
Model 8 
Constant   18.28002***  3.28    0.9255 
(0.44707) 
F(6,  28) 





chi2(1)          =     
1.58 
Prob > chi2  =   
0.2090 
F(3,  25)  =      
0.07 
Prob > F =      
0.9769 
Trade   -.1171568  -0.62  1.56 
CLCIC  -.587194***  -3.75  1.43 
LFSE  -.0966374  -0.50  2.17 
GGFCE  .8939835***  16.31  2.01 
FR  -.2477304  -0.73  3.49 
LE  -2.3619  -1.86  2.07 
Model 9 
Constant   10.08323***  2.78    0.9661 
(0.30152) 




chi2(1)            =     
1.93 
Prob > chi2  =   
0.1648 
F(3,  25)  =      
0.90 
Prob > F =      
0.4535 
Trade   -.0312021  -0.24  1.67 
CEI  -.4831094***  -3.96  1.55 
LFPE  -.044756  -0.69  1.25 
GFCF  .9915662***  25.20  1.82 
FR  .096926  0.54  2.15 
LE  -1.316011  -1.49  2.19 
Model 10 
Constant   13.2118  2.73    0.9398 
(0.40194) 
F(6,   
28)  =   
89.46**
* 
chi2(1)            =     
0.66 
Prob > chi2  =   
0.4157 
F(3,  25)  =      
0.10 
Prob > F =      
0.9609 
Trade   -.0469952  -0.27  1.68 
CEI  -.8147095***  -4.86  1.65 
LFPE  .0157693  0.18  1.24 
GGFCE  .9137664***  18.58  2.00 
FR  -.023205  -0.10  2.12 
LE  -1.250931  -1.06  2.19 
Model 11 
Constant   11.80536***  3.04    0.9671 
(0.29693) 
F(6,   
28)  =  
167.81*
** 
chi2(1)            =     
0.79 
Prob > chi2  =   
0.3741 
F(3,  25)  =      
2.25 
Prob > F =      
0.1073 
Trade   -.0713364  -0.57  1.56 
CEI  -.4679117***  -3.92  1.53 
LFSE  -.1482672  -1.17  2.14 
GFCF  .9794731***   25.27  1.82 
FR  -.1278925  -0.56  3.52 
LE  -1.496392  -1.69  2.28 
Model 12 
Constant   13.58046**  2.59    0.9398 
(0.40198) 
F(6,   
28)  =   
89.44**
* 
chi2(1)            =     
0.70 
Prob > chi2  =   
0.4037 
F(3,  25)  =      
0.08 
Prob > F =      
0.9680 
Trade   -.041775  -0.24  1.58 
CEI  -.8168789***  -4.90  1.63 
LFSE  -.0288828  -0.17  2.18 
GGFCE  .913236***  18.32  2.05 7 
 
FR  -.043689  -0.14  3.56 
LE  -1.2986  -1.08  2.27 
Model 13 
Constant   10.41765***  3.181    0.971088 
(0.27854) 
F(6,   
28)  =   
191.33*
** 
chi2(1)            =     
2.99 
Prob > chi2  =   
0.0835 
F(3,  25)  =      
0.62 
Prob > F =      
0.6064 
Trade   -0.029278  -0.239  1.67 
PSEI  -0.426679***  -4.813  1.60 
LFPE  -0.056137  -0.938  1.26 
GFCF  0.993293***  27.41  1.81 
FR  -0.029618  -0.180  2.10 
LE  -1.431790  -1.807  2.07 
Model 14 
Constant   14.20597***  3.215    0.947561 
(0.37513) 
F(6,   
28)  =   
103.39*
** 
chi2(1)            =     
1.12 
Prob > chi2  =   
0.2899 
F(3,  25)  =      
0.42 
Prob > F =      
0.7412 
Trade   -0.046678  -0.283  1.67 
PSEI  -0.686400***  -5.587  1.69 
LFPE  -0.000321  -0.0041  1.25 
GGFCE  0.915361***  20.042  1.98 
FR  -0.233601  -1.0669  2.06 
LE  -1.566052  -1.4627  2.08 
Model 15 
Constant   12.06618***  3.4119    0.971681 
(0.27567) 
F(6,   
28)  =   
195.43*
** 
chi2(1)            =     
1.36 
Prob > chi2  =   
0.2439 
F(3,  25)  =      
1.97 
Prob > F =      
0.1444 
Trade   -0.075396  -0.6446  1.55 
PSEI  -0.410129***  -4.7242  1.57 
LFSE  -0.143438  -1.2187  2.14 
GFCF  0.980203***  27.336  1.81 
FR  -0.254528  -1.2160  3.18 
LE  -1.596634  -1.9944  2.15 
Model 16 
Constant   14.45021***  3.0066    0.947592 
(0.3750) 
F(6,   
28)  =   
103.46*
** 
chi2(1)            =     
1.29 
Prob > chi2  =   
0.2556 
F(3, 25) =      
0.46 
Prob > F =      
0.7153 
Trade   -0.049288  -0.3077  1.58 
PSEI  -0.685240***  -5.6336  1.66 
LFSE  -0.020808  -0.1289  2.18 
GGFCE  0.914097***  19.772  2.03 
FR  -0.259125  -0.9092  3.49 
LE  -1.593326  -1.4614  2.16 
Model 17 
Constant   10.34064***  3.3406    0.973948 
(0.2644) 
F(6,   
28)  =   
212.84*
** 
chi2(1)            =     
1.73 
Prob > chi2  =   
0.1890 
F(3,  25)  =      
0.21 
Prob > F =      
0.8882 
Trade  0.034070  0.2885  1.72 
JLE  -0.374712***  -5.3645  1.39 
LFPE  -0.025150  -0.4476  1.24 
GFCF  0.996552***  28.933  1.81 
FR  0.030356  0.1947  2.10 
LE  -1.558564**  -2.1076  2.00 
Model 18 
Constant   14.92902***  3.1963    0.940976  F(6,    chi2(1)            =      F(3,  25)  =      8 
 




Prob > chi2  =   
0.5422 
0.82 
Prob > F =      
0.4940 
JLE  -0.532682***  -4.9604  1.45 
LFPE  0.052950  0.6297  1.22 
GGFCE  0.905901***  18.811  1.96 
FR  -0.152775  -0.6565  2.07 
LE  -1.911047  -1.7028  2.03 
Model 19 
Constant   11.51633***  3.4164    0.974482 
(0.26167) 
F(6,   
28)  =   
217.40*
** 
chi2(1)            =     
0.83 
Prob > chi2  =   
0.3629 
F(3,  25)  =      
0.73 
Prob > F =      
0.5419 
Trade  0.008130  0.0717  1.62 
JLE  -0.366677***  -5.2767  1.48 
LFSE  -0.099922  -0.8896  2.17 
GFCF  0.988680***  28.828  1.84 
FR  -0.115426  -0.5781  3.52 
LE  -1.681821***  -2.2452  2.09 
Model 20 
Constant   14.71802***  2.8573    0.940219 
(0.40053) 
F(6,   
28)  =   
90.124*
** 
chi2(1)            =     
0.19 
Prob > chi2  =   
0.6670 
F(3,  25)  =      
0.72 
Prob > F =      
0.5498 
Trade  0.051076  0.2912  1.66 
JLE  -0.538165***  -4.9367  1.48 
LFSE  0.033401  0.1925  2.21 
GGFCE  0.911179***  18.404  2.04 
FR  -0.063447  -0.2066  3.55 
LE  -1.922223  -1.6686  2.11 
Model 21 
Constant   9.471252***  3.2354    0.977184 
(0.24743) 
F(6,   
28)  =   
243.70*
** 
chi2(1)      =     
1.41 
Prob > chi2  =   
0.2357 
F(3,  25)  =      
0.91 
Prob > F =      
0.4506 
Trade  0.135619  1.1821  1.86 
CGI  -0.741167***  -6.069  1.90 
LFPE  -0.116554**  -2.1098  1.36 
GFCF  1.067339***  29.359  2.31 
FR  0.280933  1.8299  2.33 
LE  -1.469797**  -2.121  2.00 
Model 22 
Constant   14.82963***  3.0827    0.937893 
(0.4082) 
F(6,   
28)  =   
86.574*
** 
chi2(1)            =     
2.79 
Prob > chi2  =   
0.0946 
F(3,  25)  =      
1.31 
Prob > F =   
0.2946 
Trade   0.133516  0.6998  1.89 
CGI  -0.987724***  -4.6898  2.07 
LFPE  -0.060093  -0.6641  1.34 
GGFCE  0.985848***  17.29  2.60 
FR  0.158036  0.6278  2.30 
LE  -1.963098  -1.7059  2.03 
Model 23 
Constant   10.03360***  2.8298    0.973599 
(0.26617) 
F(6,   
28)  =   
86.574*
** 
chi2(1)            =     
0.35 
Prob > chi2  =   
0.5543 
F(3, 25) =      
3.29 
Prob > F =      
Trade   0.048811  0.4159  1.68 
CGI  -0.655185***  -5.0965  1.82 
LFSE  -0.024545  -0.2101  2.27 
GFCF  1.044413***  26.844  2.29 9 
 
FR  0.118775  0.5578  3.87  0.0372 
LE  -1.503714  -1.9389  2.17 
Model 24 
Constant   12.67019**  2.3547    0.938677 
(0.4056) 
F(6,   
28)  =   
87.739*
** 
chi2(1)            =     
2.27 
Prob > chi2  =   
0.1321 
F(3,  25)  =      
1.33 
Prob > F =      
0.2884 
Trade   0.123303  0.6762  1.74 
CGI  -0.997841***  -4.8014  2.05 
LFSE  0.162824  0.8969  2.36 
GGFCE  0.992932***  17.155  2.72 
FR  0.304623  0.9228  4.00 
LE  -1.680997  -1.4201  2.17 
Note: (1) *** and **denotes significant at 1% and 5% level respectively.  
Source: Authors calculation  
 
From table 1 it is evident that impact of corporate governance and all its ingredients on economic 
growth of cross-section countries
1 is significantly negative as was not expected. Impact of GFCF 
and  GGFCE  is  positive  on  the  economic  growth  of  cross-section  countries.  Sign  of  the 
coefficient of labour force with primary and secondary education is found to be varying with the 
specification i.e., in some case impact is positive and in some case it is negative. Surprisingly, 
when we replace labour force with primary and secondly education by school enrollment as a 
measure of human capital by following Barro (1991) we found more or less same results.
2 Sign 
of the coefficient of trade is also found to be varying with specifications but insignificant in all 
cases. VIF value in all models is providing evidence of multicollinearity which shows that in 
some case model suffers from near multicollinearity. F-test shows that all models are significant 
indicating  that  model  are  significant.  The  value  of  coefficient  of  multiple  correlation 
determination (in this case its value has been adjusted by degrees of freedom) is quite high in all 
models.  Breusch-Pagan  test  for  heteroskedasticity  indicates  that  no  model  suffers  from  the 
problem of heteroskedasticity at 5% level of significance. Ramsey RESET test indicates that 
model 7 and 23 suffers from the problem of linearity assumption and omitted variables at 5% 
level of significance.  
In  the  next  step  we  have  attempted  to  measure  the  impact  of  performance  of  corporate 
governance of the past year (that is 2004) on the current year (that is 2008).
3 Results of this 
analysis are presented in table 2. 
 
                                                           
1 In this specification included countries are Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bulgaria, Canada, Costa Rica, 
Cyprus, Czech Republic, Ecuador, Finland, Georgia, Germany, Guatemala, Hong Kong SAR, Hungary, Ireland, 
Israel, South Korea,  Latvia, Lithuania,  Mauritius,  Mexico,  Namibia,  New  Zealand, Pakistan, Peru,  Philippines, 
Poland, Russia, Slovak Republic, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States.  
2 Results with the incorporation of school enrollment with primary and secondary education has not been shown 
here for brevity of presentation but can be assessed by the author upon the request.  
3 In this specification included countries are Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bulgaria, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Czech 
Republic, Ecuador, Finland, Georgia, Germany, Guatemala, Hong Kong SAR, Hungary, Israel, South Korea, Latvia, 
Mexico, Namibia, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Russia, Slovak Republic, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom.  
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Table 2: Results of second specification 
Independent 
variables 




statistics   
Breusch-Pagan   Ramsey 
RESET test 
Model1 
Constant   7.597342  1.813344    0.973622 
(0.23946) 
F(6,  21) 




chi2(1)            =     
0.77 
Prob > chi2  =   
0.3814 
F(3,  18)  =      
1.52 
Prob > F =      
0.2423 
Trade   0.225431  1.807418  1.83 
CICIC  -0.5053***  -4.25029  1.93 
LFPE  -0.043399  -0.58345  1.19 
GFCF  1.03461***  27.78660  1.58 
FR  0.395964  2.075283  2.27 
LE  -1.254059  -1.22336  2.48 
Model 2 
Constant   7.734701  1.115182    0.927712 
(0.39642) 
F(6,  21) 




chi2(1)            =     
0.03 
Prob > chi2  =   
0.8519 
F(3,  18)  =      
2.16 
Prob > F =      
0.1284 
Trade   0.211345  1.020894  1.84 
CICIC  -1.00077***  -4.93251  2.05 
LFPE  0.132867  1.074581  1.20 
GGFCE  0.93146***  16.38302  1.67 
FR  -0.134427  -0.43519  2.17 
LE  -0.189399  -0.11248  2.44 
Model 3 
Constant   7.268951  1.682867    0.973223 
(0.24127) 
F(6,  21) 




chi2(1)            =     
0.20 
Prob > chi2  =   
0.6585 
F(3,  18)  =      
1.66 
Prob > F =      
0.2115 
Trade   0.223043  1.770460  1.84 
CICIC  -0.51359***  -4.31727  1.91 
LFSE  0.016790  0.149815  2.36 
GFCF  1.03539***  27.38224  1.61 
FR  0.388297  1.559228  3.81 
LE  -1.216418  -1.17714  2.48 
Model 4 
Constant   9.042227  1.247141    0.924525 
(0.40506) 
F(6,  21) 




chi2(1)            =     
0.12 
Prob > chi2  =   
0.7292 
F(3,  18)  =      
2.07 
Prob > F =      
0.1403 
Trade   0.207797  0.979570  1.85 
CICIC  -0.97243***  -4.74071  2.01 
LFSE  -0.087798  -0.46824  2.34 
GGFCE  0.92337***  15.88903  1.68 
FR  -0.169267  -0.41306  3.66 
LE  -0.296791  -0.17215  2.45 
Model 5 
Constant   13.3592***  3.411011    0.968972 
(0.25971) 
F(6,  21) 




chi2(1)      =     
1.08 
Prob > chi2  =   
0.2981 
F(3,  18)  =      
1.27 
Prob > F =      
0.3145 
Trade   0.162730  1.224613  1.77 
CLCIC  -0.34583***  -3.49433  1.41 
LFPE  -0.082452  -1.03208  1.16 
GFCF  1.04738***  25.47021  1.64 
FR  0.269780  1.324722  2.20 11 
 
LE  -2.72885***  -2.87352  1.81 
Model 6 
Constant   19.0288***  2.887650    0.912612 
(0.43586) 
F(6,  21) 




chi2(1)            =   
0.17 
Prob > chi2  =   
0.6773 
F(3,  18)  =      
0.83 
Prob > F =      
0.4970 
Trade   0.079641  0.358973  1.75 
CLCIC  -0.70512***  -4.06165  1.54 
LFPE  0.058667  0.436768  1.17 
GGFCE  0.95021***  14.72407  1.78 
FR  -0.404645  -1.21438  2.09 
LE  -3.020755  -1.88263  1.83 
Model 7 
Constant   13.3555***  3.205440    0.967398 
(0.26622) 
F(6,  21) 




chi2(1)            =     
0.12 
Prob > chi2  =   
0.7252 
F(3,  18)  =      
2.18 
Prob > F =      
0.1253 
Trade   0.150930  1.107127  1.77 
CLCIC  -0.34766***  -3.3995  1.43 
LFSE  0.001386  0.011151  2.38 
GFCF  1.04704***  24.70347  1.66 
FR  0.202894  0.742081  3.77 
LE  -2.76274***  -2.83069  1.82 
Model 8 
Constant   20.1446***  2.963965    0.913478 
(0.43369) 
F(6,  21) 




chi2(1)            =     
0.29 
Prob > chi2  =   
0.5913 
F(3,  18)  =      
0.88 
Prob > F =      
0.4708 
Trade   0.074195  0.335611  1.75 
CLCIC  -0.71524***  -4.11382  1.56 
LFSE  -0.128069  -0.63469  2.37 
GGFCE  0.94583***  14.72628  1.79 
FR  -0.548815  -1.26127  3.60 
LE  -3.072211  -1.91957  1.84 
Model 9 
Constant   10.05514**  2.491260    0.971959 
(0.2469) 
F(6,  21) 




chi2(1)            =     
0.75 
Prob > chi2  =   
0.3859 
F(3,  18)  =      
1.44 
Prob > F =      
0.2647 
Trade   0.201357  1.577988  1.80 
CEI  -0.45003***  -3.96839  1.68 
LFPE  -0.063675  -0.83590  1.17 
GFCF  1.04253***  26.92686  1.61 
FR  0.345726  1.772837  2.23 
LE  -1.891124  -1.92534  2.14 
Model 10 
Constant   12.33840  1.860733    0.924338 
(0.40557) 
F(6,  21) 




chi2(1)            =     
0.00 
Prob > chi2  =   
0.9796 
F(3,  18)  =      
1.54 
Prob > F =      
0.2379 
Trade   0.166379  0.793603  1.80 
CEI  -0.91565***  -4.72314  1.82 
LFPE  0.096159  0.766007  1.18 
GGFCE  0.94652***  15.98424  1.74 
FR  -0.239831  -0.76718  2.13 
LE  -1.368745  -0.85129  2.13 
Model 11 
Constant   9.882907**  2.341394    0.971032 
(0.25095) 
F(6,  21) 
=   
chi2(1)            =     
0.05 
F(3,  18)  =      
2.01  Trade   0.194256  1.495738  1.81 12 
 
CEI  -0.45683***  -3.95478  1.69  151.84*
** 
 
Prob > chi2  =   
0.8201 
Prob > F =      
0.1486  LFSE  0.007571  0.064810  2.37 
GFCF  1.04284***  26.32143  1.63 
FR  0.305675  1.187294  3.77 
LE  -1.885888  -1.88548  2.15 
Model 12 
Constant   13.43106  1.958581    0.923464 
(0.4079) 
F(6,  21) 




chi2(1)            =     
0.02 
Prob > chi2  =   
0.8840 
F(3,  18)  =      
1.50 
Prob > F =      
0.2483 
Trade   0.163483  0.773757  1.81 
CEI  -0.91107***  -4.67672  1.81 
LFSE  -0.110391  -0.58342  2.35 
GGFCE  0.94011***  15.78532  1.74 
FR  -0.328921  -0.80368  3.60 
LE  -1.414248  -0.87243  2.14 
Model 13 
Constant   10.20265**  2.517056    0.971584 
(0.2485) 
F(6,  21) 




chi2(1)            =     
2.26 
Prob > chi2  =   
0.1326 
F(3,  18)  =      
0.67 
Prob > F =      
0.5798 
Trade   0.185647  1.452407  1.78 
PSEI  -0.35883***  -3.90681  1.85 
LFPE  -0.076929  -1.00576  1.16 
GFCF  1.03586***  26.75483  1.59 
FR  0.204998  1.050394  2.21 
LE  -1.924093  -1.94984  2.13 
Model 14 
Constant   11.93777  1.880387    0.930354 
(0.3891) 
F(6,  21) 




chi2(1)            =     
0.02 
Prob > chi2  =   
0.8958 
F(3,  18)  =      
2.65 
Prob > F =      
0.0802 
Trade   0.148357  0.741975  1.78 
PSEI  -0.76108***  -5.10386  1.99 
LFPE  0.069126  0.576117  1.17 
GGFCE  0.94040***  16.72219  1.78 
FR  -0.519232  -1.74285  2.11 
LE  -1.305489  -0.84921  2.10 
Model 15 
Constant   10.23751**  2.406265    0.970224 
(0.2544) 
F(6,  21) 




chi2(1)            =     
0.54 
Prob > chi2  =   
0.4610 
F(3,  18)  =      
1.53 
Prob > F =      
0.242 
Trade   0.174014  1.329346  1.79 
PSEI  -0.36329***  -3.82710  1.89 
LFSE  -0.009544  -0.08019  2.39 
GFCF  1.03514***  25.94213  1.61 
FR  0.125430  0.476587  3.83 
LE  -1.947853  -1.92697  2.13 
Model 16 
Constant   13.14841  2.037586    0.931520 
(0.38584) 
F(6,  21) 




chi2(1)            =     
0.18 
Prob > chi2  =   
0.6748 
F(3,  18)  =      
3.00 
Prob > F =      
0.0578 
Trade   0.142845  0.719701  1.79 
PSEI  -0.77263***  -5.18799  2.02 
LFSE  -0.149865  -0.83375  2.37 
GGFCE  0.93495***  16.75585  1.70 
FR  -0.689237  -1.77029  3.64 13 
 
LE  -1.341991  -0.87965  2.11 
Model 17 
Constant   11.13348**  2.584601    0.967606 
(0.26537) 
F(6,  21) 




chi2(1)            =     
0.41 
Prob > chi2  =   
0.5200 
F(3,  18)  =      
1.08 
Prob > F =      
0.3843 
Trade   0.195799  1.424999   
JLE  -0.27834***  -3.28786   
LFPE  -0.034640  -0.41634   
GFCF  1.02334***  24.94380   
FR  0.205497  0.985810   
LE  -2.171325  -2.07643   
Model 18 
Constant   12.51839  1.934572    0.927035 
(0.39827) 
F(6,  21) 




chi2(1)            =     
0.59 
Prob > chi2  =   
0.4435 
F(3,  18)  =      
1.12 
Prob > F =      
0.3687 
Trade   0.188348  0.910800  1.82 
JLE  -0.63710***  -4.88969  1.86 
LFPE  0.164659  1.312617  1.22 
GGFCE  0.91885***  16.26527  1.64 
FR  -0.509088  -1.67000  2.10 
LE  -1.522977  -0.97613  2.08 
Model 19 
Constant   10.84644**  2.441401    0.967361 
(0.26637) 
F(6,  21) 




chi2(1)            =     
0.13 
Prob > chi2  =   
0.7193 
F(3,  18)  =      
1.20 
Prob > F =      
0.3391 
 
Trade   0.194458  1.405981  1.82 
JLE  -0.28423***  -3.39407  1.71 
LFSE  0.014946  0.120612  2.37 
GFCF  1.02396***  24.65380  1.59 
FR  0.199329  0.728446  3.78 
LE  -2.138266  -2.03565  2.10 
Model 20 
Constant   14.05730  2.044893    0.922038 
(0.41168) 
F(6,  21) 




chi2(1)            =     
0.15 
Prob > chi2  =   
0.7033 
F(3,  18)  =      
1.21 
Prob > F =      
0.3335 
Trade   0.182259  0.850227  1.83 
JLE  -0.60658***  -4.59214  1.79 
LFSE  -0.098509  -0.51641  2.35 
GGFCE  0.90887***  15.5646  1.64 
FR  -0.524890  -1.27182  3.60 
LE  -1.642886  -1.01571  2.09 
Model 21 
Constant   11.3058***  2.852959    0.971109 
(0.25061) 
F(6,  21) 




chi2(1)      =     
1.09 
Prob > chi2  =   
0.2972 
F(3,  18)  =      
1.77 
Prob > F =      
0.1894 
Trade   0.247359  1.868919  1.88 
CGI  -0.50938***  -3.82983  1.74 
LFPE  -0.110765  -1.43282  1.17 
GFCF  1.07834***  25.65127  1.84 
FR  0.446679**  2.200244  2.35 
LE  -2.328742**  -2.45300  1.94 
Model 22 
Constant   15.5316**  2.304619    0.915959 
(0.42743) 
F(6,  21) 
=   
chi2(1)            =     
1.58 
F(3,  18)  =      
0.97  Trade   0.248881  1.094524  1.91 14 
 
CGI  -1.0385***  -4.24150  2.03  50.045*
** 
 
Prob > chi2  =   
0.2089 
Prob > F =      
0.4270  LFPE  0.009235  0.070096  1.17 
GGFCE  1.00914***  14.57447  2.14 
FR  -0.081897  -0.24309  2.22 
LE  -2.330504  -1.43778  1.94 
Model 23 
Constant   10.46034**  2.418368    0.969164 
(0.2589) 
F(6,  21) 




chi2(1)            =     
0.17 
Prob > chi2  =   
0.6795 
F(3,  18)  =      
2.43 
Prob > F =      
0.0991 
Trade   0.240757  1.756016  1.89 
CGI  -0.50373***  -3.66348  1.75 
LFSE  0.093096  0.773688  2.36 
GFCF  1.08111***  24.60314  1.88 
FR  0.494385  1.811703  3.97 
LE  -2.31024**  -2.33392  1.98 
Model 24 
Constant   14.84833**  2.092768    0.916281 
(0.4266) 
F(6,  21) 




chi2(1)            =     
1.23 
Prob > chi2  =   
0.2669 
F(3, 18) =      
0.62 
Prob > F =      
0.6139 
Trade  0.258679  1.133863  1.93 
CGI  -1.04662***  -4.26537  2.05 
LFSE  0.058006  0.292896  2.36 
GGFCE  1.01214***  14.48070  2.18 
FR  0.015251  0.034615  3.82 
LE  -2.247448  -1.37748  1.98 
Note: (1) *** and **denotes significant at 1% and 5% level respectively. 
Source: Authors calculation  
 
From table 2 it is evident that impact of corporate governance and all its ingredients on economic 
growth of cross-section countries is significantly negative in this case also. Impact of GFCF and 
GGFCE is positive on the economic growth of cross-section countries. Sign of the coefficient of 
labour force with primary and secondary education is found to be varying with the specification 
i.e., in some case impact is positive and in some case it is negative but in none of the case it is 
significant. Surprisingly, when we replace labour force with primary and secondly education by 
school enrollment as a measure of human capital by following Barro (1991) we found more or 
less same results in this case also.
4 Sign of the coefficient of trade is also found to be varying 
with specifications but insignificant in all models in this case also. In this case we find that 
impact of fertility rate is positive and significant (in model 21) and impact of life expectancy is 
negative and significant (for example model 5, 7, 21 and 23). VIF values in all models indicate 
that there is problem of near multicollinearity. F-test shows that all models have good fit and 
adjusted R
2 (i.e., value of coefficient of multiple correlation determination adjusted by degrees of 
freedom) in all models is quite high indicating that explanatory power of the variables included 
in  the  analysis  is  considerably  high.  However, Ramsey  RESET test indicates  that  no  model 
suffers from the problem omitted variables and linearity assumption of the OLS at 5% level of 
                                                           
4 Results with the incorporation of school enrollment with primary and secondary education have not been shown 
here in order to save space but can be assessed by the author upon the request.  15 
 
significance. Breusch-Pagan test for heteroskedasticity indicates that no model suffers from the 
problem of heteroskedasticity at 5% level of significance.   
5.  Conclusions  
In this study we analyzed the impact of corporate governance on the economic growth in cross-
section of countries in two different specifications with various models by using different control 
variables.  In  first  specification  we  measured  static  impact  of corporate  governance  in cross-
section  of  countries
5  and  in  second  specification  we  estimated dynamic  impact  of  corporate 
governance  on  the  economic  growth  of  cross-section  of  countries.  For  analysis  we  have 
employed log liner model. We found that performance of corporate governance is significantly 
negatively related to the economic growth in both specification and in all models and hence it 
matters not only for the current year but it continues to persistent in future also. Addition to it, 
we found that role played by human capital is insignificant but physical capital and government 
final consumption expenditure plays significantly positive role in the economic growth of cross-
section of countries.  We also find that impact of life expectancy and fertility rate is negative and 
positive on economic growth respectively. We found that trade do not has significant impact on 
the economic growth in cross-section of countries.  
References  
Andrade, A and J. P. Rossetti (2004) Governança Corporativa, São Paulo: Atlas, 237.  
Babic,  V.  (2003)  Corporate  governance  problems  in  transition  economies,  Winston-Salem: 
Wake Forest University, Social Science Research Seminar, 2. 
Barro, Robert J. (1991) “Economic growth in a cross section of countries” The Quarterly Journal 
of Economics 106, 407-443. 
Brown, L, M. Caylor and Brown (2004) “Corporate governance study links bad boards to higher 
risks and increased volatility”, A Study Commissioned by ISS, February 4.  
Charreaux, G. (1997) La creation de valeur de l’entreprise, Economica, Paris, France, 10. 
Claessens, S. Corporate (2003) “Governance and Development, Global Corporate Governance 
Forum” The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank.  
De Paula, G. M. (2003) Governança Corporativa no Brasil e México: Estrutura Patrimonial, 
Práticas e Políticas Públicas, Santiago do Chile, Cepal, 7-8. 
Gompers,  P,  J.  Ishii  and  A.  Metrick  (2003)  “Corporate  governance  and  equity  prices”  The 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 118, 107-155.  
Harris,  M  and  A.  Raviv  (1978)  “Some  results  on  incentive  contracts  with  applications  to 
education and employment, health insurance and law enforcement” American Economic 
Review 8, 20–30. 
Holmstrom, B. (1979) “Moral hazard and observability” Bell Journal of Economics 10, 74–91. 
International  Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA) (2002) “ISDA  17
th Annual General 
Meeting” Berlin. 
Jensen, M. and W. Meckling (1976) “Theory of firm: managerial behaviour, agency cost and 
ownership structure” Journal of Financial Economics 3, 305–60. 
                                                           
5 Data on corporate governance is available for 104 countries for the year 2004 however, due lack of availability of 
data for other variables number of sample size has got reduced.  
 16 
 
Monforte,  J.  G.  (2004)  “Introdução”  in  Governança  Corporativa  by  A.  Andrade  and  J.P.  
Rossettiv, Eds., São Paulo: Atlas, 16. 
Otsuka,  K.  and  Y.  Hayami  (1988)  “Theories  of  share  tenancy:  a  critical  survey”  Economic 
Development and Cultural Change 37, 31–68. 
Pass, C. (2004) “The revised combined code and corporate governance: an empirical survey of 
50 large UK companies” Managerial Law 48, 467–78. 
Shavell,  S.  (1979)  “Risk  sharing  and  incentive  in  the  principal  and  agent  relationship”  Bell 
Journal of Economics 10, 55–73. 
Weimer, J. and J. C. Pape (1999) “A taxonomy of system of corporate governance” Corporate 




The name of the countries for which data of corporate governance is available for the year 2004 
in the World Bank official website is shown as follows.   
Algeria  Brazil  Estonia  Jordan  Nicaragua  Singapore 
United Arab 
Emirates 
Angola  Bulgaria  Ethiopia  Kenya  Lithuania  Slovak Republic  United Kingdom 




g  Slovenia  United States 
Australia  Chad  France  Latvia  Macedonia  South Africa  Uruguay 
Austria  Chile  Guatemala  Madagascar  Nigeria  Spain  Venezuela 
Bahrain  China  Honduras  Malawi  Norway  Sri Lanka  Vietnam 
Bangladesh  Colombia  Hong Kong  Malaysia  Pakistan  Sweden  Zambia 
Belgium  Costa Rica  Hungary  Mali  Panama  Switzerland  Zimbabwe 
Gambia  Croatia  Iceland  Malta  Paraguay  Taiwan   
Georgia  Cyprus  India  Mauritius  Peru  Tanzania   
Germany 
Czech 
Republic  Indonesia  Mexico  Philippines  Thailand   
Ghana  Denmark  Ireland  Morocco  Poland  Trinidad and Tobago   
Greece 
Dominican 
Republic  Israel 
Mozambiqu
e  Portugal  Tunisia   
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